The sociological dimensions of the development of a sectarian orientation in early Imami Shiʿism have remained sparsely explored since Marshall Hodgson posed the question 'How did the early Shia become sectarian?' in 1955. This article explores Imamic hadith statements on the canonical ritual payment of zakāt/ṣadaqa as a way of tracking the crystallisation of communitarian boundaries. It argues that the Shiʿi Imams, especially Imam Bāqir, fit into a common Muslim discourse regarding the payment of zakāt, for example in the case of an unjust Imam. However, the hadiths of the Imam Ṣādiq show a pivot towards the more clearly differentiated Shiʿi juristic positions of the Occultation period. Imamic statements on zakāt, therefore, must be seen as neither identical to Sunni positions, nor to classical Twelver Shiʿi formulations, but rather as dynamic responses to developing circumstances. In using Imamic hadiths to track early Shiʿi doctrine, this article also suggests directions for the development of a methodology for using hadiths to track historical developments, a venture which has barely begun. In dealing with the Shiʿi Hadith corpus, the author calls for an epistemological scepticism, coupled with a methodological positivism, assuming that while Imamic hadiths may merely act as mouthpieces for later doctrinal positions, it is also very possible that they do originate in the circles of the Imams to whom they are ascribed, and should be analysed as such in order to track chronological developments in the Hadith corpus.
In what follows, I aim to show that one way of going beyond the heresiographical definition of a group is to 'follow the money'. The Shiʿi conception of who should collect, distribute and receive the Islamic canonical alms taxes provides us with a conceptual framework that helps us understand the ideal structural characteristics of the community and the way it maintained boundaries with other communities. In particular, the distinctions about to whom one should pay zakāt must be understood as functioning clearly to mark affiliation and loyalty to a particular group and leader, in a way that the more fluid realm of doctrinal belief cannot. I will focus on two particular questions in the Shiʿi law of zakāt that 'sociological history' is concerned with the theories and structures upon which society is based. In this article, I aim to elucidate not just the narratives of Shiʿi history, but rather the structural dynamics of the Shiʿi community, insofar as these structures can be reclaimed. 4 BULLIET 1979. Formal hadith collection efforts were well under way during the lives of these Imams, though the great muṣannaf and ṣaḥīḥ hadith collections of the 9 th and 10 th centuries, were compiled after this point had been reached. See BROWN 2009: 18-34. 5 For an overview of the sectarian perspective in early Shiʿi sources, see KOHLBERG 1988 and KOHLBERG 1985; DAKAKE 2007. 6 By 'classical' in the context of Imami Shiʿi law, I refer to the foundational texts of the Occultation era, before the Safavids, especially the 11 th -14 th centuries, when the foundational doctrines of the sect had stabilised, and the use of both hadith and rational uṣūli methodologies had been widely accepted. are pertinent to the task of determining the nature and expression of the commitment made to one's community: first, whether one should allow zakāt to be collected by an unjust Imam; and, second, if one distributes it oneself, how communitarian boundaries shape the practice of this ritual giving. 
Methodology
The evidence I analyse below is centred on the statements of the Shiʿi Imams Abū Ǧaʿfar Muḥammad al- Bāqir (d. 117/735, or 118/736) and Abū ʿAbd Allāh Ǧaʿfar alṢādiq (d. 148/765) regarding the Islamic canonical tax known as ṣadaqa or zakāt. Many of their statements regard the precise quantities and timing of the payment of ṣadaqa/zakāt, and many replicate what one can find in Sunni hadith collections. I focus on those statements that present distinctive information on the relationship between giver, collector and recipient of zakāt. The richest vein of material I have found is in the chapters of zakāt and the chapters on ḫums in the earliest large Twelver hadith compilations, of Kulaynī and Ibn Bābūyah, both of whom were active in the 4 th /10 th century, and thereby represent some of the earliest extant texts that contain substantial numbers of fiscal hadiths.
10 I will suggest that there are some indications that reports in the Hadith corpus as it pertains to zakāt do appear to reflect intellectual developments dating from the time of the Imams. At the very 9 Ritual militates against a stable definition, and a practice like zakāt clearly has an instrumental or 'rational' function, as well as being a ritual expression of commitment, fulfilling a soteriological and purificatory function. As Edmund Leach suggests, even though 'no useful distinction may be made between ritual acts and customary acts but that in discussion of ritual we are concerned with aspects of behaviour that are expressive (aesthetic) rather than instrumental (technical). Ritual action, thus conceived serves to express the status of the actor vis-à-vis his environment, both physical and social '. See LEACH 2000: 173. This framework for the way in which sacred and the economic meet (in contrast to Durkheim's more complete separation of the sacred and the profane) provides a framework for our understanding of the ritual nature of the act of giving zakāt. Shiʿi alms/tax-giving practices communicate a commitment to a particular Imam, and thereby membership in a particular community. In addition to having a mundane 'rational function'-the social redistribution of wealth-they also have a soteriological function of guaranteeing the legitimacy of prayer, and enabling the believer to attain paradise. While zakāt may be considered an instrumental financial institution that has the effect of redistributing wealth in the community of the faithful, it is also one element of a larger ritual, material and aesthetic complex that ties the believers to the Imam. The giving of money to the Imam is often portrayed as part of a pilgrimage sequence that sometimes includes the hajj as well as a pilgrimage to the house of the Imam. Reports describing visits to the Imam or his agents often involve payment of money, but they also describe the circulation of gifts in the opposite direction, from the Imams to their followers, including written blessings and ritual objects like funerary shrouds and funerary balm. I have called this system, the 'sacred economy' of the Imamate, as a way of uniting both the ritual-sacral aspect with the instrumental aspect of the redistribution of wealth. See HAYES 2015. This, however, deals with a later period, and it will require further research to understand when the different elements of this sacred economy might first have been established. For one of the numerous examples where bringing money to the Imam is seen as part of the hajj pilgrimage, see IBN BĀBŪYAH, 10 I surveyed most of the major early Imami hadith compilations and tafsīrs from the 8 th to the 11 th centuries, before confining my study to these two collections, which contained the most important hadiths for this topic. Among the non-Imami sources, I surveyed the following: al-NUʿMĀN, Daʿāʾim al-Islām; Imām al-HĀDĪ ILÀ 'L-ḤAQQ YAḤYĀ b. al-Ḥusayn, Kitāb al-aḥkām fī ʼl-ḥalāl waʼl-ḥarām.
least we can say that the Imams' statements do not easily conform to the mainstream opinion of later Imami jurists that zakāt should only be paid to the true Imam, and should not be paid to non-Shiʿis.
11 As such, I will approach the Imami Imams' statements on ṣadaqa/ zakāt on their own terms, rather than attempting to align them with later Imami doctrine.
Our understanding of the dynamics of the formation of the Shiʿi Hadith corpus has advanced tremendously in the past few decades, but much detailed work remains necessary to understand the processes of formation, transformation, reproduction and preservation that lead to the form and content of the hadith collections as we have them today.
12 While legal hadiths do not tend to display the same tendency to fit suspiciously into narrative tropes as historical aḫbār, 13 they were clearly formed and developed in response to ongoing debates over legal and political frameworks for correct ritual practice. My work is partly informed by the Schachtian understanding that hadith reports often reflect later disputes rather than the ideas of the people to whom they were ascribed. However, though I work with an epistemological scepticism, at our current stage of analysis of the Shiʿi Hadith corpus 14 I deem it necessary to introduce a certain methodological positivism. Thus, I work with the assumption that the hadiths ascribed to certain Shiʿi Imams might indeed originate with those Imams, or men in their circle. While this may prove to be an operational fiction, it will provide a methodology to help us begin to understand the internal dynamics of the Shiʿi Hadith corpus. 19 and by the time of Bāqir and Ṣādiq, a juristic enterprise was under way to impose order on the ad hoc revenue-generation mechanisms that had emerged during the first century and a half of the Islamic community. A distinction is often made in later juristic literature between ṣadaqa as referring to voluntary charitable gifts to the needy, and zakāt as referring to the obligatory payments incumbent on every Muslim of means, 20 but this distinction is usually not visible in the hadiths themselves, where ṣadaqa is the dominant term for both forms. There is also a distinction between zakāt, which is due every year, based on capital wealth and/or income, and the obligatory zakāt al-fiṭr, which is distributed at the end of Ramadan. In addition, the early juristic sources exhibit confusion over the categorisation of the agricultural tithe (ʿušr), which was sometimes considered as zakāt, and sometimes categorised under ḫarāǧ.
21 When dealing with the short telegraphic Imamic statements, which are shorn of context and recompiled in hadith works, we often cannot tell exactly which kind of subcategory of zakāt/ṣadaqa we are dealing with. In these statements, as in other examples of early juristic writing and hadith, ṣadaqa and zakāt are usually used synonymously, or at least with a great deal of semantic overlap. Ṣadaqa is the term most often used in hadith reports, while zakāt tends to be used as the rubric under which these hadith reports were compiled, reflecting the ongoing process of systematisation of terminology. The rubrication of these chapters provides ambivalent testimony, as it often seems to conflate, under the rubric of zakāt or ḫums, hadiths from very different contexts in order actively to construct a particular view of Imamic practice. Thus, though I draw largely upon the chapters on zakāt or ḫums, I do not treat them as essentially belonging to those chapters.
Ṣadaqa and zakāt should be seen within a broader ecosystem of other Islamic canonical revenue categories such as ʿušr, ḫarāǧ, ḫums, ǧizya, and waqf, which are also characterised by a greater or lesser terminological ambiguity, and often overlap with each other. 22 In the Shiʿi context, it is helpful to compare the developing discourse on zakāt with the ḫums, both of which came to be understood as scriptural categories of Islamic canonical tax or alms, the payment of which indicates one's commitment to a particular leader or govern-mental structure. The major difference between these in the Shiʿi context came to be the fact that while the Imam was not allowed to use the ṣadaqa/zakāt for himself, due to the fact that he belonged to the ahl al-bayt, 23 the ḫums, on the other hand, came to be viewed as the Imam's personal prerogative. 
Zakāt and Imamate: The fiscal claims of the Imami Shiʿi Imams
As is well known, sect-formation in Islam was set in motion by the very first conflicts that followed the death of Muḥammad and developed in the generations to come. The Umayyad rulers began to develop an imperial style, a body of bureaucratic and legal practices and rulings, and an ideology of religiously legitimated rule. Meanwhile, a varied set of movements developed oppositional ideologies, tracing their opposition back to the example of ʿAlī's conflict with the Umayyads, and holding out hope that one of his descendants or family members would recreate a rule of justice they felt to be lacking. However, the early Shia were not a homogenous movement, but rather a collection of diverse responses to the legacy of ʿAlī and the prophet's family.
25 It is hard to know when and to what extent the Shiʿi group identities came to be expressed in recognisably communitarian elements such as geographical separation, divergent beliefs, and separate ritual practices. Dakake has argued that, from the lifetime of ʿAlī, his followers' support has had a theological content, most especially the idea of walāya as a binding charismatic contract, which formed the foundation for later developments in Shiʿi thought.
26 It is likely that very soon, pre-existing tribal and local identities came to be woven into new 'Shiʿi' expressions of communal identity and ritual practice. Najam Haider notes that, in relation to second/eighth century Kufa, Shiʿi life was deeply textured by its embodiment in particular locales, and particular ritual practices, such as ways of praying, which marked the Shiʿi practitioners apart from their neighbours.
27 Shiʿi community identities, therefore, were not imposed purely from above by Imams and elites. Much of what came to be constituent of 'Shiʿi identity' would have emerged from the grass roots, and some of this would have been pseudonymously placed into the mouths of the Imams to add to its authority.
The crystallisation of systematic theories of the Imamate, produced by intellectual elites among both Shia and non-Shia, was significant, however. The Imami Shiʿi theory of Imamate first appears to have crystallised in the second/eighth century, in the circle of Ǧaʿfar al-23 Who was and was not able to receive zakāt depends on the definition of the phrase ahl al-bayt, who, it was agreed, were not allowed to receive the zakāt/ṣadaqa. The interpretation of ahl al-bayt developed gradually, and its meaning has come to range from just the prophet's wives, to encompass the entire tribe of Hāšim (for example for Abū Ḥanīfa and al-Šāfiʿī). See GOLDZIHER, VAN 30 The establishment of the Imams' revenue-collection protocols must be seen as a part of the broader institutional and conceptual foundation of the Imami Imamate.
While the Imami Imams have typically been seen as 'quietist', compared to the more 'activist' Zaydi Shia, the Imami legal hadiths on ḫums and zakāt problematise this assumption. As we shall see below, Imami legal hadiths suggest that the Imams ordered the Shia to pay zakāt to them or their functionaries, in preference to the functionaries of the Caliph. What was the creation of the Imami Shiʿi financial system meant to achieve? The creation of a state within a state? Preparation for future rebellion? Certainly, some sources indicate that ʿAbbasids perceived Imami revenue collection as a threat, prompting the persecution of the Imam's followers.
31 Part of the problem here is that we have few sources for understanding the actual practice of zakāt collection, whether by the caliphal government or among oppositional groups, though Petra Sijpesteijn has made an important contribution through her work on the Egyptian papyri and their evidence for governmental collection of ṣadaqa.
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The fiscal claims of the Imami Shiʿi Imams
At some point, probably during the mid to late second/eighth century, the Imams began to assert their right to collect Islamic canonical revenues.
33 A motley system of gifts and contributions to the Imams probably already existed. These were supplemented and explained by an increasingly systematic set of canonical dues, which were established by associating them with existing Quranic categories of canonical alms taxes, the payment of which marked one's commitment to an Imam.
34 These categories also paralleled Umayyad governmental efforts to legitimise their revenue collection, resulting in an implicit conflict. While we cannot be sure of the exact timeline of historical development of the Imami revenue collection system, one historical circumstance stands out as a terminus ante quem for the existence of substantial Imami Shiʿi institutions of revenue collection. Kāẓim's agents rejected his successor, claiming that Kāẓim had gone into Occultation, and they then refused to hand over to his successor the apparently large amounts of money they had collected in Kāẓim's name. 35 This provides clear proof that at least by the time of Kāẓim there was a substantial amount of money being collected in the name of the Imam. The collection of these large sums from the community would have required some form of doctrinaltheoretical justification-either developed pre-emptively, or, more likely developed ex post facto. The Imamic statements on the Islamic canonical taxes (especially zakāt and ḫums) were a part of this conceptual backdrop for the development of community funding mechanisms. This is not to say that all of these categories of revenue would have been treated the same once collected. On the contrary, the rules regarding the use of zakāt and ḫums are distinguished, for example, by the fact that no part of the zakāt could be used by the Imam for his own purposes, unlike the ḫums, due to the fact that the zakāt donations were conceived as carrying away the impurity from the donors, something which the ahl al-bayt could not accept due to their pure lineage.
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While many of the statements of Bāqir and Ṣādiq are difficult to contextualise historically, we may assume that Kāẓim's revenue-collection system did not emerge without any precedent. We can find suggestive material in statements like the following, in which Ṣādiq is depicted as justifying his collection of zakāt, or some similar tax, perhaps in the face of a sceptical community:
Ibn Bukayr reported: I heard Abū ʿAbd Allāh [Ṣādiq] (AS) say, '[If] I take a dirham from one of you, and even though I am one of the wealthiest people in Medina, in doing so I wish nothing else than that you should be purified (tuṭhirū)'.
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While this does not explicitly mention ṣadaqa or zakāt, the apologetic tone suggests that the Imam may be defending an innovation he has made in collecting money from his followers, who do not all consider it to be fully warranted. The context suggests the ritual function of purifying the donors that is associated with the payment of ṣadaqa and zakāt, based on the Quranic usage.
38 If Ṣādiq were indeed claiming the zakāt, then this would seem to imply a direct challenge to the caliphal prerogative of collection of the canonical Islamic revenues.
39 While this statement is not clearly datable, the apologetic tone suggests that it derives from a period in which payment of canonical dues to the Imam was not a self-evident duty, but something that had to be established through statements ascribed to the Imam. 38 Quran 9:103. In the Imami context, the ḫums is also said to have a purificatory role, though it is not said to contain the dregs of impurity that prevents zakāt from being used by the ahl al-bayt. KULAYNĪ, al-Kāfī, I: 546. 39 Modarressi also refers to reports in which the ʿAbbasid caliph Manṣūr is said to have complained that Ṣādiq was receiving zakāt, and even ḫarāǧ land taxes from his followers. MODARRESSI 1993: 13.
Payment of canonical taxes to an unjust Imam
One of the matters of controversy among early jurists was the extent to which imperfect governmental authorities could be entrusted with the weighty duty of collecting and distributing a believer's ṣadaqa/zakāt. Towards the end of the Umayyad period, the pietyminded juristic movement (which formed the immediate intellectual context for the legal statements of Bāqir and Ṣādiq) was often hostile, or at least ambivalent, towards Umayyad power, hence Hodgson's reference to the intellectual pioneers of the time as part of a 'pious opposition'. 40 Though the extent of the participation of the scholars in a 'pious opposition' has been recently challenged by Steven Judd, 41 we can still use the phrase to apply to the common cause made against the Umayyads by many pious scholars (albeit not all) amongst the Shia and proto-Sunnis. This ambivalence towards Umayyad power prompted the question of whether it was legitimate to pay zakāt taxes to an unjust ruler, a question perhaps exacerbated by innovations in the conception and practice of these taxes. 42 The divergent responses to this question crystallised into the positions espoused by classical jurists, some of whom counselled a maximalist acceptance of governmental tax and the legitimacy of those who collected it, others a minimalist approach. Zaydis, for example, tended to stress the Imam as the only legitimate collector and distributor of the alms taxes, while at the other end of the spectrum, Ḥanbalīs tended to recommend that believers should distribute the alms tax personally, whenever possible.
43 If the ruler were corrupt, then this would complicate matters, and though the Sunnis were generally more tolerant about a corrupt Imam than the purist Shia, some Sunnis still did not allow payment of the canonical taxes to a corrupt or unjust collector. 44 The classical Shiʿi position, for example as given by Ṭūsī in his Ḫilāf, is that an unjust or sinning Imam is a contradiction in terms because the Imam is incapable of error (maʿṣūm), and that payment of zakāt could only be legitimate if it reached its legitimate recipients.
45 However, this position represents a classical, crystallised and systematised Shiʿi law, rather than the position of the Imami Shiʿi Imams, whose statements on this topic give a more ambivalent, shifting picture than Ṭūsī would have us believe.
46 In fact, the Imamic hadiths show evidence of having been formed in dialogue 41 Steven Judd has provided a salutary critique of the oversimplified image that, 'the 'Abbaasids were religious; the Umayyads were not', and that Hodgson's idea of the 'piety-minded opposition' to the Umayyads implied that the scholarship of the hadith scholars and legal scholars under the Marwanids was 'inherently subversive, if not openly revolutionary'. JUDD 2014: 5. Page | 289
with the broader spectrum of juristic opinions amongst the pious opposition. As we shall see, the hadiths of Imams Bāqir and Ṣādiq are also contradictory in significant ways. The statements of the Shiʿi Imams are, in fact, comparable in several ways to the discourse in early Sunni texts. Key questions include whom should one pay zakāt to; whether zakāt counts if it is extracted by a ruler coercively; whether and under what circumstances the individual should distribute taxes autonomously; and which kinds of people constitute legitimate or preferable recipients for zakāt. While the Shia may have objected to Umayyad power, in some statements, the Shiʿi Imams clearly state that the canonical taxes taken by the rulers are legitimately counted towards a Muslim's ritual duty. Several Imamic hadiths make the point that zakāt and other taxes taken through coercion by the authorities are to be counted as fulfilling one's obligation to pay the canonical taxes. These tend to deal with the 'visible' property that can be ill concealed from tax collectors: livestock, the produce of agriculture and mines.
47 In one such report, Ṣādiq is depicted as saying that, given the option, it is preferable not to pay zakāt to the Umayyad-era caliphal authorities: 
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Ultimately, despite the preferred principle of avoidance of the caliphal taxman, believers are given a pragmatic dispensation from having to pay zakāt twice in the case of coercive collection of taxes, apparently in order to avoid the unnecessary diminution of capital. It is interesting to note the specifically Umayyad context, which locates this statement in a particular political landscape of the pious opposition to the Umayyads. This Umayyad context and the tolerant attitude to governmental collection suggest that this may well be an early opinion, contrasting to later, more intransigent Imami juristic opinions.
The 
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This decision is based on a piece of juristic reasoning based on the fact that prayer, hajj and fasting do not have a recipient, and therefore pertain only to the performer, but zakāt has recipients in the world, and therefore is invalidated if it is paid to the wrong person, and assuming here that the Imam and his functionaries are the only ones with the requisite justice to make sure the zakāt reaches its correct recipients. When invalidated, the purificatory function of payment remains unfulfilled. While this is intellectually consistent, its consequences for social group dynamics are liable to be extreme, as it sets an exceptionally a high bar for conversion of one's allegiance to the Imam, 54 and suggests the ritual impurity of those whose allegiance is to another Imam. Even so, in itself, repaying zakāt that has been misappropriated is not unknown in Sunni jurisprudence. As Calder notes, in the case of a corrupt tax-collector (ʿāmil):
Māwardi acknowledged that if the ultimate distribution was unjust (not in accord with the law) the individual should not in fact pay his zakāt to the ʿāmil but should hide it, or, if it was taken willy nilly, should repeat the zakāt in order to gain reward.
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The big difference between Māwardī's position and the Imams' is that the Imams explicitly invoke sectarian theological criteria rather than injustice or corruption. This position may 52 Ibid.
53 KULAYNĪ, al-Kāfī, III: 545. 54 Dakake suggests that this would have been an unrealistic expectation. DAKAKE 2007: 248. 55 CALDER 1981: 474. allow for attenuation according to circumstance, 56 but nevertheless we may note that Bāqir and particularly Sādiq appear to move the Shiʿi discourse on canonical taxes towards what will become a formal division between confessional groups, establishing matters of belief as determinants of ritual practice, and therefore also powerful determinants of social boundaries. The ritual implications extend beyond zakāt itself, for it was understood that unless zakāt was paid in its proper place, prayer would be invalidated.
57 From the perspective of dating it is interesting to note that the rather specific 'heretical' groups mentioned here are early sects, though they continue to survive in the heresiographical imagination,
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and therefore might easily be a later construction of groups known to have been active in the Umayyad period.
We are faced with a problem when we compare this latter report of Bāqir and Ṣādiq, which is intolerant to mispaid zakāt, with the previous Imamic report, which is more tolerant of, albeit not encouraging towards, payment to the Umayyads. What is the explanation for this clear divergence? It is possible that it was generated later, as we might be led to suspect from the fact that the more intolerant attitude conforms more closely to the more hermetic sectarian divisions of the classical Shiʿi jurists? One possibility, then, is that the apparently more tolerant opinion is earlier, before the crystallisation of sectarian positions. Another explanation may relate to the precise context implied. In the latter report from Bāqir and Ṣādiq the context is subtly different, as it does not refer to faithful Shia who pay zakāt due to coercion (a context also applicable to the opinion ascribed to Mālik) but rather it refers to committed members of 'heretical' non-Shiʿi groups who later convert to follow the right Imam. Thus, the reason for the discrepancy may be due to an implicit distinction between payment to an unjust Imam by faithful Imamis for reasons of coercion, and payment to an unjust Imam by those who are fully committed to that unjust Imam. In the latter case, one's zakāt has not been legitimately paid, because one was living beyond the community of salvation, and therefore must be paid again.
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56 This hadith is followed by one in which Ṣādiq states that if a man does his best to identify the appropriate recipient, but he cannot, then he need not pay his zakāt a second time, KULAYNĪ, Kāfī, III: 545.
57 Ibid.: 499; 506. The danger of non-payment of zakāt was no insignificant matter. Because of failure to properly perform zakāt, we are told, the majority of Muslims were destined for damnation. Ibid.: 497.
58 Ḥarūriyya is one of the names applied to the early Ḫāriǧites, whose successive uprisings posed a prominent threat to governmental authority in Iraq up until the end of the Umayyad period. See DELLA VIDA, 'Khārid̲ j ̲ ites', EI². The word murǧiʾa did continue to be used by Shia both as a specific theological label and as a more general derogatory name for Sunnis into the ʿAbbasid period. See MADELUNG, 'Murd̲ j ̲ iʾa', EI². The ʿUthmāniyya did not continue to exist beyond the 4th/10th century, CRONE, 'ʿUt̲ h̲ māniyya', EI². The Qadariyya, were an equally early movement, the precursors of the Muʿtazila in upholding human free-will, VAN ESS, 'Ḳadariyya', EI².
Generational tension between Imamic opinions
One possible explanation for the internal contradictions between the Imamic statements is that there was a generational change in policy between the Imams as they responded to the great upheavals of their day: the uprisings and instability of the late Umayyad times followed by the regime change and suppression of the Shia under the ʿAbbasids. The existence of a generational change in Imamic opinion is, in fact, explicitly borne out within some of their hadiths. Ṣādiq appears in one statement as explicitly raising questions about his father's legal opinions, in the process of developing his own position on the subject: Sulaymān b. 
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This is a difficult passage, but it is clear that Bāqir is allowing his followers to count what the Sultan appropriates towards their canonical zakāt, even though the illegitimacy of the Caliph means that the zakāt might not go to its proper recipient. In this hadith there appears to be a tension between Ṣādiq's idealism and Bāqir's pragmatic dispensation to allow payment to the illegitimate Caliph to fulfil ritual requirements, regardless of its ultimate destination. In this sense Bāqir appears to fit into the framework of pragmatic tolerance that existed among Sunni jurists, while Ṣādiq seems to take a step closer towards the classical Imami opinion, which regards only payments to the true Imam, that is, the Shiʿi Imam, as legitimate. Can we read this as a generational shift? If so, it is not the only such hadith that suggests a generational shift. 61 While this does not clear up the problem of contradiction entirely (after all, the most intransigent statement requiring the payment of back taxes is ascribed to both Bāqir and Ṣādiq) it seems plausible that the contradictory nature of the Imamic law of zakāt may, in part, have been due to generational development in the policy between Bāqir and Ṣādiq, as they responded to changing circumstances. Tolerance towards caliphal collection seems to have been the Imamic norm, stemming from a pragmatism common also to some Sunnis, however, as later statements ascribed to Ṣādiq's son, Mūsā al-Kāẓim, also grant dispensations for his followers to pay zakāt to the caliphal agents under circumstances of coercion. law of the Imams, instead, they responded to political circumstances to make judgements about the payment of taxes. This generated internal contradictions that were later glossed over by the Occultation era classical Twelver jurists.
Giving to the initiated
If an individual distributes the zakāt autonomously instead of giving it to the Imam for distribution this raises a further set of issues, in particular in determining an appropriate recipient. Though the classes of people eligible to receive zakāt were understood to have been explicitly designated in Quran 9:60, the religious affiliation of the recipients also came to be a consideration affecting the proper distribution of the zakāt. The Imamic hadiths imply the existence of inner and outer circles of religious legitimacy that were understood as separate categories. The hallowed inner circle consisted of the ahl al-walāya, Shiʿi Muslims who recognised the rightful Imam. The next circle consisted of unknown Muslims, followed by non-Muslims, and in the outer darkness, to be avoided at all costs, were the vocal anti-Shiʿi Muslims (the nāṣibīs), to whom zakāt was categorically denied.
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In the following report on the distribution of zakāt we are given a further sense of Ǧaʿfar al-Ṣādiq's shifting policy in defining who is a legitimate recipient of zakāt. In this report, the operative element is not the recipient's professed religious identity, but what the recipient 'knows', which may, perhaps, allude to sectarian affiliation, to one's spiritual ranking, or to some other criterion. Ǧaʿfar al-Ṣādiq is questioned by Zurāra about whether the Quranically-stipulated recipients should receive the zakāt, 'even if they do not know?' Ṣādiq responds as follows:
The Imam gives to all of those because they concede obedience to him. And Zurāra said: 'And if they do not know!?' And [Ṣādiq] replied: 'Oh Zurāra, if those who know were given [the ṣadaqa], to the exclusion of those who do not know, then not enough proper recipients would be found for the alms. And we only give to the one who does not know in order to encourage him in faith, and make him firm in it. But as of today, you and your companions must not give to anyone but someone who knows. Whoever you find among those Muslims who is knowing, then give to him rather than the [ordinary] people (nās)'.
64
This report is mysteriously elliptical. We cannot be exactly sure what it is that these people do not know. It might be the identity of the true Imam, thereby equating this report with the above-mentioned report, which refers to the people of walāya. In this case, 'those who do not know' might perhaps refer to Zaydi-style Shia who do not acknowledge the distinctive claim of the Fatimid lineage. Or it might refer to some kind of esoteric or initiatory knowledge that neophytes are excluded from, as in the Fatimid Ismaili, 65 Nuṣayri, 66 or Druze models. 67 We see, however, that there are not enough of these initiates to act as recipients for the ṣadaqa of all the Shia. Ṣādiq indicates that Zurāra and his companions 68 are in a select circle advised to act in a particularly meticulous manner by distributing ṣadaqa only within the circle of initiates. This would also appear to adjust our understanding of what Dakake sees as an essentially non-hierarchical community in which charity is regulated according to membership in the Shiʿi community in its largest possible sense.
69
This kind of inward-looking fiscal practice, if carried through, would lead to a community with an internalising, insular sacred economy centred upon the figure of the Imam, and perhaps was the basis for the core of the intensely sectarian community that emerged over the course of the ʿAbbasid era.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the creation of a sectarian community is not just a matter of belief, but also the introduction of structures and protocols that crystallise and formalise boundaries. While we cannot pinpoint exactly the moment of genesis of the Imam-centred zakāt collection procedures in the Imami community, these statements of Bāqir and Ṣādiq clearly express a set of protocols that tend to separate their followers from the wider community, establishing a hierarchy of excellence and access to the Imam. Given the scanty sources, Imams' hadiths are among our best evidence for the origins of the insular Imami fiscal system: a system which became so very important at the time of the death of Kāẓim, and even more so upon the death of al-ʿAskarī, when it was the fiscal agents who announced the new era of the Occultation, and took quasi-Imamic authority upon themselves. There are three aspects which give us hope that what we are looking at reflects some historical reality: firstly, the Imamic hadiths diverge from classical Imami positions expressed in works of hadith and fiqh from the fourth/tenth century, and especially the fifth/eleventh century, being less intransigent, and closer to Sunni discourses, suggesting that they may well represent an earlier state of thinking and acting, in which Shiʿi discourse was less clearly demarcated from proto-Sunni and other schools of thought. Secondly, there are indications within the hadith reports themselves that the Imams recognised change between their opinions, suggesting that they were reacting to historical circumstances and the developing legal discourse. While we cannot clearly correlate these changes with particular historical events, it is significant that they appear to be engaged with the evolution of doctrine. They do not claim to express timeless truths, but suggest shifting realities that must be explained and justified. Thirdly, some of these hadith reports allude to the specific historical context of the Umayyad period, suggesting perhaps that the Imamic position on zakāt began to be 
